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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
It is interesting to note that the court's additional reliance on
CPLR 3140 was unnecessary because the appraisals were not
within CPLR 3101 (d) to begin with. They were not, therefore, in
need of the release-from-immunity provided by CPLR 3140.3
ARTICLE 32- AccELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3216: Court disavows Cohn holding and finds rule
constitutional.
Under CPLR 3216, a court may dismiss an action for failure
to prosecute. The conditions precedent to such dismissal, however,
are that issue must have been joined, one year must have elapsed
since the joinder, and movant must serve a written demand upon
the dilatory party requiring that prosecution be resumed and a note
of issue be filed within 45 days of the demand.
Recently, the appellate division, first department, in Cohn v.
Borchard Afiliations,84 held 3216 unconstitutional on the ground
that it unreasonably interfered with a court's inherent power to
control its calendars. However, Justices Stevens and Tilzer dis-
sented, pointing out that the legislative rule-making power, exer-
cised here, merely imposed a modest restriction on a court's powers
that alone was insufficient to render the rule unconstitutional.
In a recent case, Johnson v'. Parrow,5 defendant moved to
dismiss for neglect to prosecute under 3216. Because defendant
failed to serve a 45 day demand upon plaintiff, as is required under
3216, the motion was denied. In express repudiation of the Cohn
holding, the Court sustained the validity of 3216 on the authority
of article VI, section 30 of the New York State Constitution."6
83 See 7B McKiNNEY'S CPLR 3140, supp. commentary 162, 163 (1968).
8430 App. Div. 2d 74, 289 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1st Dep't 1968). For a detailed
discussion of this holding, see 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. com-
mentary 304 (1968). See also The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,
43 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 302, 330 (1968).
85 56 Misc. 2d 863, 291 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1968).
s8 Article VI, section 30 provides, inter alia:
The legislature shall have the same power to alter and regulate thejurisdiction and proceedings in law and in equity that it has heretofore
exercised. The legislature may . . . delegate . . . any power
possessed by [it] . . . to regulate practice and procedure in the
courts.
While the rule-making power, therefore, rests ultimately in the legislature,
the Judicial Conference has, in fact, been delegated the power to make
"Rules" for the CPLR (as distinguished from "Sections," which only
the legislature can enact) subject to legislative veto and control. See N.Y.
JUDICiARY LAW § 229. For a discussion of the rule-making power, vis-1-vis
article VI, section 30, in which the constitutionality of 3216 is urged,
see 7B MCICNNEYS CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 304, 307-09 (1968).
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The present status of CPLR 3216 is clearly in a state of con-
fusion. It is submitted, however, that the constitutional mandate
of article VI, section 30 lodges power in the legislature to enact
a rule such as 3216. In fact, that power was expressly given to
the legislature by the first constitution of the State of New York,
in 1846, and has continued without interruption to our present
constitution. Moreover, as Justice Stevens urged in his dissent in
Cohn, 3216 is not operative until the conditions precedent have
been fulfilled, and one such condition is a demand that a note of
issue be filed within 45 days of the demand. Since a case is not
actually on a court's calendar until a note of issue has been filed,
7
it is difficult to contend that the rule unconstitutionally interferes
with a court's inherent power to control its calendars.
CPLR 3216: Fourth department applies amendment retroactively.
The retroactive application of amended 3216, effective on Sep-
tember 1, 1967, has been the subject of conflict recently between
the first and second departments of the appellate division,88 i.e.,
the second department has quite consistently given the amendment
retroactive effect, 9 whereas the first department has not.90
The appellate division, fourth department, in a recent case,
Williams v. Baker,91 reversed special term's order of March 3,
1967, and denied defendant's 3216 motion to dismiss because of his
failure to give the notice provided for under the new 3216(d).
The court reasoned that an appellate tribunal usually applies the
law as it exists on the date it makes its decision, "notwithstanding
the fact that a change has been made in the law since the date of
the appealed order." 92 Thus, the fourth department is now, ap-
parently, applying 3216 retroactively.
CPLR 3216: Third department does not give amendment retro-
active effect.
A condition precedent to a 3216 dismissal for failure to prose-
cute is that movant serve a written demand upon plaintiff, requir-
ing that prosecution be resumed and a note of issue be filed within
87See Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 30 App. Div. 2d 74, 78, 289 N.Y.S.2d
771, 775 (1st Dep't 1968) (dissenting opinion).
88 See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHIN's L.
REv. 436, 456 (1968); 43 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 142, 158 (1968); 7B Mc-
KINNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 312 (1967).
89See Terasaka v. Rehfield, 28 App. Div. 2d 1011, 284 N.Y.S.2d 168
(2d Dep't 1967); Kaprow v. Jacoby, 28 App. Div. 2d 722, 281 N.Y.S.2d
591 (2d Dep't 1967).
90See Leonard v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d
844, 281 N.Y.S2d 555 (1st Dep't 1967).
9129 App. Div. 2d 915, 290 N.Y.S.2d 188 (4th Dep't 1968).
921d.
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